The case between Vriend v. Albearta depicted the difference in opinion with regards to the Canadian charter based judiciary. Justice Frank allocated several pieces judgment on the verdict on the case by safeguarding the democratic charter. Justice Frank was of the view that the Supreme Court has a contemporary function, which he defined as a purpose that serves the trustee. This purpose entitles to the charter and evaluates the duties of the legislature pointing on the specific executives for the interest of the social contract that is democratically appointed.
The dominating matter of judicial responsibility lies between the dimensions of understanding the existing relationship contained in charter based judiciary and the democratic governance.
The explanation of the underlying matter is attributed to the study of Hogg/Bushell legislation. The study has fundamentally analyzed important claims from a normative assumption portrayed in the response. The evaluation of the study presents many weaknesses that are tied to the claims and entire assumptions on an open framework analysis. The charter-based judiciary cannot be easily sustained on a democratic legitimacy approach. This is emphasized by the operational weakness developed from the dialog thought. The weakness extended to nullify the portrayed evidence which could support the evidence of this theory.
The content of the Hogg/Bushell study is a controversy that highlights the simplicity in the democratic legitimacy version as a simple critic. The evaluation of the study can be considered as an incremental contributor to democratic debates and arguments on the charter based judiciary. This is true since the purpose of this critic is to question the interpretation from Hogg/Bushell on the genuine constitutes of a charter dialog. This approach entails engaging an open forum for the discussion of the perceived perspective from the two.
The court functions together with legislators to engage in an open dialog that permits exchange in defining protected rights and the individual freedoms as a support claim. According to the refined approach, the charter based judiciary is complex in dimension than the purported claim from Hogg and Bushell. This is evidence based on the legislative sequel under the charter dialogue property provided only for the representatives. The explanation to this circumstance defines that where positive responses are attained from legislative actors, then a judicial nullification can proceed. This unique element has been omitted in the Hogg/Bushell study on the entire charter dialogue concept. A perceived criticism in defining the six degrees can be summarized in a narrow definition, which excludes the two dialogues.
The deductions in the Hogg/Bushell study present a negative legislative continuation, which has been purported to be the genuine charter dialogue. This can be replaced by establishing a relationship of equal grounds defining the Supreme Court and the legislators. The negative legislative follow up are imposed by democratic actors as independent actions to formulate the hierarchical relationship that exists among judges and legislatures. This overview indicates that a judiciary interpretation is achieved from legislative compliance incorporated with a legislative continuation to preserve the charter’s interpretation by an independent body or organ.
The judicial review is an essential component of the decision making process. As a personal opinion, I agree with this approach on grounds that the possibility of reforming the law is embraced and the same re-enacted laws are bound by a legislative sequel. This is important because the charter based judiciary depends on the Supreme Court and the legislature at large. This opinion can be supported by the fact that the competent legislative organs exist within a judiciary system. These competent organs can reform the charter based judiciary for the interest of maintaining the existence of the law.
I am of the opinion that the judicial review should only be entitled to a legislative body with experience in the field. This is contemporary to the presented case study where individuals question the charter based judiciary system of the democratic dimension. I support the decision to ignore the position to nullify an officer instead of the statute. In this regard, I support the decision on grounds that possible judicial interference could tamper with the democratic exercise. This is narrowed down to the power allocated to the unelected judges who dominate every legislative decision.
I also support the fact that lack of evidence or firsthand accounts on the decision form the Supreme Court could have biased the study; hence, resulting to an irrational conclusion. This kind of approach could have resulted to interpretation of the charter dialogue with a loss of vital components that direct the nature of the ruling systems. This would have been rectified by a consideration of earlier cases that had a dimensional nature that revolves on the charter. The consideration on the cases would have provided firm ground for critical judgment in relation to the charter. The assumption might have provided a different perspective on the charter based judiciary analysis providing a relevance to the entire study. I am convinced that future studies should be analytical on the cases that comprise the charter for an effective approach.