Relationship Between Auditing and Assurance

Question 1: The Principal-Agent Conflict and its Significance

In the framework of business governance, reputation mediators or agents are those who offer a guarantee or support corporate communications founded on which strangers make choices. Given that the public depends on their declarations of assurance, it is significant that reputation agents uphold and increase their reputations with faultless demeanor at all occasions. In carrying out their roles, reputation mediators should sustain high standards of individual and professional honesty, and be purposeful in the recommendation they provide.  In certain conditions, they should ensure that they are autonomous in material and form (Katharine, 2012). These reputation mediators or agents have a principal-agent connection with those who employ them; the affiliation between stakeholders and constitutional auditors is a typical instance. Reputation agents as well have a non-direct liability to stakeholders; for instance, to regulators, media, and workers who depend on the pledges they offer.

In the conventional principal-agent hypothesis, also known as agency hypothesis, the connection between proprietors (principals) and corporation managements (agents) is typified by the allocation of the choice-making power to agents. The agent carries out an influential position in studying the assorted magnitude of an industry, as providers, expenses, workers, consumers, and shareholders. The agent is necessary to carry out his or her labors in the finest welfare of the principal. Nevertheless, as both parties are dedicated to capitalizing on their utilities, this theory identifies the agency expenses that appear from the division of ownership and management. Agents are probable to have intentions that vary from those of their owners or principals (Katharine, 2012. There is, therefore, a tendency for definite conflicts of attention between the administration, investors, and debt-holders. These disparities of interest can crop up from asymmetries in the allocation of income and data asymmetries. These irregularities could result in a contingency where companies could take more danger than their enthusiasm would otherwise permit.

Given that it is not practically reasonable for the principal to watch the actions of agents at the entire occasions, there is a danger of expedient opportunistic performance in the area of the agents or mediators. Principals can be short of dependence in their mediators or agents in respect of these data irregularities. In this setting, auditors operate as reputation mediators or agents since they are essential to authenticate the confidence that principals put on their agents. It is in this context that the agency hypothesis assists to clarify the origin and growth of audit by portraying agency associations between managers and principals (Paul, 2013). In this respect, auditors are decisive in their position as reputation mediators’ agents as they offer a self-governing check on the effort of agents. The auditors assist to prevent or decrease the likelihood of conflicts that crop up from conflicting interests of principals and their mediators or agents, or account on such disagreements that may exist so that the owners or principals are accordingly informed. The need to settle such conflicts led to the crop up of the need for audit many centuries ago to help in the settlement of the disagreements.

Question 2: Describe the lessons learned by auditors in the aftermath of recent audit failures

The Enron audit scandal is the key noteworthy corporate fall in the United States ever since the breakdown of many savings and loan banks during the 1980s (Paul, 2013). This scandal reveals the necessity for considerable improvements in accounting and business control in the United States, in addition to a close observation at the moral excellence of the civilization of business in general and of business conglomerate in the United States.

There are numerous reasons for the Enron crumple. Amongst them are the disagreement of attention between the two positions carried out by Arthur Andersen, as inspector or auditor but as well as an advisor to Enron; the inadequacy of interest revealed by members of the Enron committee of executives to the off-books monetary units with which Enron operated industry; and the management been short of truthfulness concerning the health of the corporation and its commerce performances. In some means, the civilization of Enron was the most important reason for the fall. The higher executives thought Enron had to be the most excellent at all the operations it carried out and that they had to defend their standing and their recompense as the most flourishing senior managers in the U.S. When a number of their dealing and trading undertaking began to operate poorly, they attempted to conceal the company’s malfunctions.

In the United Kingdom, several of the lessons learnt from the Enron fall down were documented into what is at the present the UK Business Governance Policy or the leadership given under the system (Katharine, 2012). For instance, the leadership of Audit boards requires them to give an account of how outside auditor independence and sovereignty is protected if the corporation’s outside auditor as well offers it with non-audit packages, including domestic audit.  In the come around of the 2008 monetary disaster, the outside audit’s responsibility as an instrument to reconstruct investor self-assurance is once more a middle theme. It is a lesson that clearly comes out following the Enron’s fall.  The EU’s suggestion to transform the inspection market that was announced included a ban on audit companies providing non-review service, as well as interior audit, to their outside audit consumers. Such practices were found to contribute greatly to the collapse of the Enron Company.

Another lesson learned was that the board of directors was not considerate to the kind of the off-books units developed by Enron, or to their duties to observe those entities immediately they were accepted. It is essential for the board of directors to pay great attention to all off-book operations for the good governance of the business (Paul, 2013).  The committee did not give attention to the workers since most of the managers in the United States do not believe this as their accountability. The managers learned that it was their accountability to give attention to their staff.  The managers should regard themselves as representatives of the investors as well as for the workers. The directors should represent the workers and the investors exceptionally well in all the company operations.

Question 3: The history of ‘whistle-blowers’ reveals few to have been auditors. Why is this so?

Whistleblowing is more and more in the news with high-status cases such as Mid Staffordshire, Olympus, and prior to those cases the whistleblower revelations of an excessive threat taking at HBOS as the monetary situation took hold. In reaction, commissions and inquiries have suggested measures to support whistleblowing processes and practices. Whistleblowers are growing to be bolder, whether inspired by fear or sense of right and wrong. However, in the majority of the many cases of fraud reported through whistleblowing, only a few have been reported by auditors.

As societies rely on whistleblowers to make public unlawful activity in government and profitable organizations, such workers occupy an undecided place in organizations. Some view them as brave heroes except for others they are harmful conspirators. Whistleblowing is frequently a final alternative, even for persons who have an agreement and officially authorized sense of duty to report bad behavior and illegitimate activities. The risk administrators, observance human resources, and anti-cash laundering officials are among the highest-status whistleblowers in situations in the banking and economics business. Such officials have been found to be the most preference officials on the issues of whistleblowing (Paul, 2013). The jobs of such officials in the United States are not simple these days. This is not merely because they are needed to carry on with more and more severe and compound regulatory programs across the world. Even occasionally elicit disbelief or resentment from colleagues has been found to hold back many officials and employees from reporting fraud in state and private organizations. A further reason, only a few auditors, have been whistleblowers because their revelations can sometimes terrorize to knock over deeply-embedded dishonest practices that profit their contemporaries.

The auditor department is one of the section that is very sensitive to any organization whether a public or private institution. Therefore, such institutions have very strict rules and regulatory measures to govern and guide the auditing department in such sectors. The personnel in such departments have to be obedient and thus comply with each and every of the regulations. Failure to observe the regulations and the rules automatically calls for the resignation or sacking of the non-compliant workers. As a result of the strict and the stern regulatory and guidelines in the auditing department, many of the auditors have not been able to report any wrongdoing in most of the organizations that have been affected (Paul, 2013). The auditors have been careful to observe each and every law for the safe operation of their organizations and the security of their jobs. Further, most of the nations across the globe have constitutions that bar the auditors from reporting any irregularities in an organization. This is more common in state-owned institutions whereby the rules are strict, and departments have to observe the rule of the law to the latter. Therefore, that is the reason a small numbers of cases of whistleblowing have been through auditors.

Katharine, B. (2012). Audit and Assurance Essentials: For Professional Accountancy Exams. New York: Wiley Publishers.
Paul, C. (2013). Modern Auditing and Assurance Services, Google eBook. New York: Wiley Publishers.